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Abstract
We analyze a two-attribute single item procurement auction that uses yardstick
competition to settle prices. The auction simplifies the procurement process by
reducing the principal’s articulation of preferences to simply choosing the most
preferred offer as if it was a market with posted prices. This is done simply
by replacing the submitted sealed bids by yardstick bids, computed by a linear
weighting of the other participants’ bids.
We show that there is only one type of Nash equilibria where some agents
may win the auction by submitting a zero price-bid. Using a simulation study
we demonstrate that following this type of equilibrium behavior often leads
to winner’s curse. The simulations show that in auctions with more than 12
participants the chance of facing winner’s curse is around 95%.
Truthful reporting, on the other hand, does not constitute a Nash equi-
librium but it is ex post individually rational. Using a simulation study we
demonstrate that truthful bidding may indeed represent some kind of focal
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point.
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1. Introduction
Efficient and flexible procurement systems are often crucial for the success of
any organization. The procurement system should enhance competition on both
price and quality while being as simple as a posted price market. In this paper
we analyze a two-attribute auction mechanism aiming at this level of simplicity.
The mechanism uses the so-called yardstick competition in order to both facili-
tate price competition across multi-attribute offers and to postpone the buyer’s
procurement decision to simply select the most preferred commodity or service
as in a traditional market with posted prices. The applied yardstick principle is
known from the regulation of natural monopolies (see e.g. [1]) and [8] has pre-
viously suggested yardstick competition as an integrated part of multi-attribute
auctions. However, as [8] point out, straightforward use of yardstick competi-
tion introduces sophisticated strategic manipulation. We analyze this in more
depth and show that this rather rough but simple straightforward use of yard-
stick competition promotes truth-telling and makes complex procurement look
like posted prices. As such, this paper is in line with the ongoing challenge in
designing operational flexible trading systems that facilitate transparent com-
petition on both price and other attributes - while keeping the transaction costs
low.
To be more precise we consider a procurement mechanism where: A group
of sellers (with private information about their production cost) each submit a
sealed price-quality bid, to be interpreted as the quality level they are willing
to deliver if compensated by at least their asking price. The sealed price-bid
is replaced by a yardstick price which is determined as a convex combination
of the two efficient ”neighbor” price-bids. The buyer then selects one of these
bids as a winning bid (without having to articulate his preferences, via a scoring
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function, in advance). The winner commits to deliver and is compensated with
his associated yardstick price.
As such, this mechanism is a special case of what is called a Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA) based auction in a recent paper by [8]. Although they
consider a mechanism with known scoring function, their paper already noted
that when the buyer’s preferences are unknown to the sellers, their strategies
become complicated to analyze and that they are likely to deviate from truth-
telling by bidding above their true cost.
In the present paper we follow up on these conjectures. We show that there
are no Nash equilibria where all sellers submit a strictly positive price-bid. For
instance, the seller with the highest quality level can always win the auction by
submitting a zero price-bid and being reimbursed the computed yardstick price.
Yet, bidding zero may prove to be a fatal strategy since the seller will often
win the auction with a loss. Using a simulation study we show that in auctions
with 4 participants the chance of winning the auction with a gain for the seller
with the highest quality level is only 20% and that this number quickly drops
to 5% as the number of participants increases. In other words, it appears that
equilibrium behavior in the sense of zero quantity-price bidding is highly risky
for the sellers who can easily end up facing winner’s curse if they follow such a
strategy.
On the other hand, we shall argue that even though truth-telling is not a
Nash equilibrium it is still very likely to be some kind of a focal point when using
the mechanism in practice. The basic intuition is that since improving a seller’s
chances of winning the auction requires bidding quite substantially above or
below the true cost, the sellers run into two problems: a) bidding substantially
above increases the risk of being excluded from the auction (in the sense that the
bid lies above the yardstick price) and b) bidding substantially below increases
the risk of winning the auction with a loss since the compensation is likely to
be below the actual true cost.
In our simulations, we consider the bidder who wins the auction if everyone
tells the truth and then we examine if this bidder will remain the winner even
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if we allow the other bidders to misreport their true cost with up to 20% both
above and below. We show that allowing the other bidders to misreport rarely
results in a new winner that wins with a gain. It happens in less than 11-20%
of all cases. Combined with the fact that truth-telling guarantees non-negative
pay-offs (is ex post individually rational) our results point towards truth-telling
as a focal point in practice.
We emphasize that this paper is not about designing the optimal procure-
ment auction, but rather an attempt to analyze the performance of this par-
ticular multi-attribute yardstick auction inspired by the DEA-based auction in
[8]. The reason for looking at yardstick prices as opposed to any other type of
posted prices in the form of mark-ups on the observed price-bids, is that the
sellers are unable to influence their own yardstick price by their bid. Another
reason is that the construction of the yardstick prices does not involve the buy-
ers weighting prices and other attributes. Hence it becomes apparent that the
yardstick auction may have some desirable strategic properties: Indeed, as our
paper demonstrates, this is highly likely to be the case in practice.
As mentioned, we focus specifically on the situation where it is too costly
(or impossible) for the buyer to articulate his preferences, e.g., via a scoring
function. It is well recognized that preference elicitation in e.g. multi-attribute
auctions is costly and requires substantial decision support or mechanism de-
sign that mitigate these costs, see e.g. [27], [21] and [22]. Determining a scoring
function may be complicated for several reasons: For instance, when the buyer
is a single person and the scoring represents the buyer’s intra-personal trade-
offs between price and quality; these complications are a central topic of a large
literature on Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), see e.g. [26]. Fur-
thermore, when the buyer represents a group of persons (e.g., an organization),
the construction of the scoring function may further involve inter-personal con-
flicts2. The complication of this is reflected on the large literature on Social
2For instance think of a procurement decision in a cooperative where different members’
interests have to be aggregated
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Choice, see e.g. [3] and [20].
Empirical cases support the claim that determination of a scoring function is
a difficult matter. For instance, in the conservation reserve program the USDA
(United States Department of Agriculture) ranks the bids into a score. The
actual determination of these scoring rules has been widely discussed, see e.g.
[5, 4]. The applied scoring has also been an issue in the wholesale market for
electricity in California, where the choice of an unsuitable scoring rule had se-
vere consequences, see [12] and [13]. Hereby, we conclude that if the cost of
constructing suitable scoring functions is too high, there are alternative types
of procurement mechanisms that leave out a priori preferences and hereby po-
tentially make the entire procurement simpler.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 relates the paper to the exist-
ing literature and Section 3 introduces the procurement setting and the notion
of yardstick prices. Section 4 defines the yardstick auction and discusses strate-
gic bidding by the sellers. Section 5 introduces the simulation framework and
the results are presented in Section 6 along with a discussion of our parameter
choices. Section 7 concludes.
2. Relation to the literature
Unlike auctions in general, the theoretical literature on multi-attribute auc-
tions is relatively sparse. A related line of literature, however, concerns the
widely used systems for e-procurement which have several similarities with
multi-attribute auctions, for example in how they automate negotiations (see
e.g. [11] for an introduction to some of these systems). There are several pa-
pers suggesting an incorporation of multi-attribute auctions into the so-called
Request for Quote (RFQ) systems, see e.g. [19] and [7]. RFQ systems use the
Internet to improve the searching and matching process between buyers and sell-
ers in general. [18], [24] and [25] provide surveys as well as suggest mechanisms
that combine multi-attribute negotiation and auction systems.
The seminal paper on multi-attribute auctions by [14] analyzes the two most
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common scoring auctions: the first score and the second score auction.3 These
two auctions have many similarities with the first and second price auctions.
In fact, [14] proves that the revenue equivalence theorem also holds for the first
and second score auctions4 and shows that the second score auction is efficient
and strategy proof.5
In the literature on multi-attribute auctions there are only a few papers
relaxing the assumption of an a priori given value function for the principal.
[15] investigate the issues of setting quality thresholds that are unknown to the
bidders. [6] study the sequential learning of the value function and bidders’
cost functions by a sequence of scoring auctions with different scoring functions.
However, [6] do not directly address the risk of strategic bidding and in essence
presume truthful revelation in the sequence of trial auctions.
In this paper we analyze a yardstick auction which basically replaces the
principal’s scoring with a yardstick competition: The principal simply chooses
among ”posted” yardstick prices. As a starting point for this research we use
the paper on DEA auctions by [8]. However, we relax their assumption that the
principal will announce a priori his scoring function6.
3. The model
We consider a procurement setting along the lines of the model in [14]. A
risk neutral principal is seeking to procure a commodity (or a service) from one
of n risk neutral agents, i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}. The commodity supplied by agent i
is characterized by a one-dimensional quality level yi ∈ R+. In order to focus on
the adverse selection problems we further assume that delivery of the promised
qualities can be costlessly enforced (e.g. by a harsh penalty for deviations).
3In a first score auction, the bidder with the highest score wins and has to meet the highest
score. In a second score auction, the bidder with the highest score wins and has to meet the
second highest score.
4Using the revenue equivalence theorem as it is presented in [23].
5However, it is not given that the second score auction is the most preferred auction by
the principal. [8] show that it is possible for the principal to extract more informational rent
while the auction remains efficient and strategy-proof.
6The idea of a yardstick auction can also be found in [2]. They suggest an auction design
for so-called combinatorial auctions based on the same type of yardstick principle.
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Agents (sellers) can produce different levels of quality and their costs will
depend on an underlying common cost function as well as their individual ef-
ficiency levels. More formally, an agent producing the quality level yi faces a
cost ci(yi, i) ∈ R+. The parameter i represents the efficiency of agent i which
is private information. Meanwhile, all agents know that they operate under a
common cost structure C(y) ⊆ R2+.
Regarding this common cost structure, we assume that
C(y) = min{x | y can be produced at cost x}
satisfies A1 and A2 below:
A1. C(.) is weakly increasing : y′ ≥ y ⇒ C(y′) ≥ C(y),
A2. C(.) is convex : C(γy + (1− γ)y′) ≤ γC(y) + (1− γ)C(y′),∀γ ∈ [0, 1].
We will think of agents efficiency in terms of the classical radial Debreu/Farrell
efficiency index (see e.g., [16]). That is, the individual cost of agent i is deter-
mined as
ci(yi, εi) = εiC(yi). (1)
and the bids can be interpreted as observations of the underlying common cost
function. The principal is unaware of C(·) but knows that C satisfies A1 and
A2.
We assume that the actual quality level yi is verifiable and fixed for each
agent i. Thus, possible strategic manipulations by the agents can only regard
the costs, and the signal from each agent i is simply a price-quality bid
(xi, yi) ∈ R2+ (2)
with the interpretation that agent i will produce his quality level yi if he is paid
at least xi.
The principal uses the bids to determine which agent to procure from and
what to pay him and the other agents through an auction mechanism. To
formalize, let di(xi, yi) ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether agent i supplies the offered
commodity or not and f i(xi, yi) ∈ R+ denote his payment. As it will become
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clear below, f(xi, yi) depends on the agent i’s yardstick price (defined in Section
3.1).
The aim of the participating agents is to maximize their (expected) profit.
The profit to the winning agent is:
pii(xi, yi) = f(xi, yi)− ci(yi, i), (3)
while the aim of the principal (buyer) is to maximize (expected) net private
value, i.e., the value generated by the good minus the compensation to the
agent. We follow the literature in assuming that value is represented by a
weakly increasing concave function of the agents’ qualities V (yi). However, it
should be noted that the principal is unaware of the value of the good V simply
because it may be too costly to assess all the information needed to express a
full value function. However, when facing a list of posted prices, the principal
is able to make a specific choice.
3.1. The Yardstick Prices
From the number of different cost models satisfying requirement A1 and
A2, we follow [8] and focus on a model where the cost structure (illustrated in
Figure 1) is estimated using the smallest convex envelopment of the observed
bids {(xj , yj)}j∈N , i.e.,
Ĉ(y) = inf{x ∈ R+ | x ≥
∑
j∈N
λjxj , y ≤
∑
j∈N
λjyj ,
∑
j∈N
λj = 1, λj ≥ 0,∀j ∈ N}. (4)
For each agent i ∈ N we define a yardstick price x¯i using the estimated
cost structure (4) on the reduced bid-sample where agent i’s bid is excluded
(illustrated in Figure 2):
x¯i = inf{x ∈ R+ | x ≥
∑
j∈N\{i}
λjxj , yi ≤
∑
j∈N\{i}
λjyj ,
∑
j∈N\{i}
λj = 1, λj ≥ 0,∀j ∈ N \ {i}}. (5)
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Figure 1: Convex envelopment of the sub-
mitted bids
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Figure 2: The yardstick price for agent 2
For agent i, the above solution identifies a single point (x¯i, yi) on the frontier
estimated by the smallest convex envelopment of the submitted bids except for
agent i’s own bid.
Note that the bid of agent i has no influence on his own yardstick price, but
influences the yardstick price of the neighbor bids if his bid is cost efficient. Let
Ne ⊂ N denote the set of agents with cost efficient bids. Agent i ∈ Ne has a
neighbor to the left (il) and to the right (ir) defined as,
il = arg maxj∈Ne{yj |yj < yi}
ir = arg minj∈Ne{yj |yj > yi}.
For example, in Figure 2 the left neighbor of agent 2 is agent 1 and the the
right neighbor is agent 3. Thus, 2’s bid influence the yardstick prices of both
agent 1 and 3.
Furthermore, note that for the bidder with maximal value of y, the associated
yardstick price will be infinite. Thus, in the yardstick auction presented below
we require the principal to be able to announce an upper bound on the bids, i.e.
the highest value of y and its associated reservation price x that the principal is
willing to accept so that every agent is guaranteed a yardstick price. We denote
this reservation point zP . Consequently, there is no need for a specification of
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a similar lower bound on quality.
We find it reasonable to assume that the principal is able to specify zP , or
in other words that the principal can express the willingness to pay for the best
possible quality and only that. Although we consider this limited articulation
of preferences to be unlike the difficulties in e.g. expressing aspiration points
in multi-criteria models as discussed in [17], we recognize that expressing zP is
associated with a cost and leave it for future research to find a way to avoid
such preference information a priori. As an example, a principal who lacks
information about high quality may exclude bids, but in practice such cases will
occur with very low probability; and if it does happen, the principal can adjust
his reservation quality and price over time when/if the auction is repeated. As
such zP could be the result of a learning process for the principal.
Example 1: Let four agents {1, 2, 3, 4} submit bids:
z1 = (x1, y1) = (1, 3),
z2 = (x2, y2) = (2, 5),
z3 = (x3, y3) = (3, 6),
z4 = (x4, y4) = (2.5, 4),
and let the principal state his reservation point zP = (5, 7). Note that agent
4’s bid is inefficient when the common cost function is estimated by the smallest
convex envelopment of the four bids.
Now, according to the definition (5) the yardstick bids are found as follows:
z¯1 = (x¯1, y1) = (2, 3),
z¯2 = (x¯2, y2) = (2.33, 5),
z¯3 = (x¯3, y3) = (3.5, 6),
z¯4 = (x¯4, y4) = (1.5, 4).
Consider for example the determination of the yardstick price for agent 2.
Agent 2 has efficient ”neighbor” bids by agent 1 and 3. Hence, the yardstick
is found from the convex combination λ(3, 1) + (1 − λ)(6, 3) for y = 5, i.e., for
λ = 1/3, yielding yardstick price x¯2 = 1/3× 1 + 2/3× 3 = 2.33.
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Note that for agent 1 only the bid of agent 2 is used to determine the yard-
stick while for agent 3 we need the reservation point zP as the right ”neighbor”
bid (with z2 as the left bid). Moreover, since the bid of agent 4 is inefficient the
yardstick price x¯4 is smaller than the original price-bid x4. 
4. The Yardstick Auction
We analyze a procurement auction defined by a stepwise procedure. In
Step 0, the principal starts the auction by publicly announcing zP stating the
maximum value of the attribute in question yP and its reservation price xP for
yP . zP enters the auction as a submitted bid and thereby, xP addresses the
problem of non-existing yardstick price for the maximal value of y among the
bidders as explain in Section 3. Then, in Step 1, the bidders submit sealed
bids. In Step 2, the yardstick prices (x¯i) are computed (as defined in 5 and
illustrated in Figure 2). If x¯i ≥ xi the bidder’s original price-bid is replaced
by the computed yardstick price otherwise the bidder will not be assigned a
yardstick price (i.e. a cost inefficient bidder will not be assigned a yardstick
price). In Step 3, the principal reviews the yardstick bids and selects a single
yardstick bid as the winner of the auction. Step 4 finalizes the auction by
compensating the selected winner with his yardstick price. Formally,
The mechanism:
Step 0: The principal announces the procurement proposal and an upper bound
on the bids zP = (yP , xP ), where yP is the highest acceptable value of y
and xP is the highest acceptable price for yP .
Step 1: Each participant i ∈ N submits a single sealed bid zi = (xi, yi). Let
Z be the set of bids including zP , i.e., Z = {zi}i∈N ∪ zP .
Step 2: A yardstick price x¯i for all i ∈ N is computed using (5) and replaces
xi if xi ≤ x¯i. If, for some j ∈ N, xj > x¯j , agent j will not be assigned a
yardstick bid. Let z¯i = (x¯i, yi) be the yardstick bid of agent i ∈ N and
let Z¯ be the set of such yardstick bids.
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Step 3: The set Z¯ is presented to the principal, who selects the winning bid
z¯i
∗
Step 4: Only i∗ is compensated by x¯i
∗
.
Let  on Z¯ denote the principal’s binary preference relation. Following the
notation introduced in Section 3 the auction is defined by the allocation and
payment functions which take the following forms:
di(zi) =
 1 if z¯i  z¯j for all z¯j 6=i ∈ Z¯0 if otherwise (6)
f i(zi) =
 x¯i if z¯i  z¯j for all z¯j 6=i ∈ Z¯0 if otherwise (7)
where zi = (xi, yi).
To this end, the auction may be seen as a mechanism for settling posted
prices on services or commodities with linear weighting of price and other at-
tributes. In fact in comparing with the second score auction with linear weight-
ing, the mechanism settles the most pessimistic prices seen from the principal’s
point of view. To see this, note that the yardstick prices are equal to the highest
possible second score compensation with linear scoring.
4.1. Bidders’ Strategic Behavior
We now turn towards the bidders’ strategic behavior. As discussed, we
consider the situation where it is impossible (or very costly) for the principal to
articulate a scoring function a priori. For instance, in case of a public institution
that represents social (aggregate) preferences. However, we assume that it is
possible for the principal to make a unique selection in Step 3 of the mechanism.
The fact that the principal cannot announce (and commit to) a scoring
function a priori complicates the analysis of the bidders’ strategic behavior
simply because bidders cannot form an expectation concerning how their bid
will influence the chance of winning the auction. Indeed, bidders only know
their cost ci and their quality level yi.
12
Bidders choose their price-bids xi strategically and want to maximize their
expected pay-off pii(xi, yi) = x¯i×Prob{i wins}− ci(xi, yi). Note that x¯i and ci
are unaffected by i’s strategic choice of price-bid. Thus, i can only influence his
expectation of winning the auction Prob{i wins}.
We say that a strategy profile {x˜i}i∈N is a Nash equilibrium if there does
not exist an agent j and a strategy xj such that pij(xj , yj) > pij(x˜j , yj) given
{x˜i}i6=j .
Although, agents do not know how the principal will choose the winner of
the auction and cannot influence their own yardstick price there is still ample
room for manipulation.
Observation 1: Consider a given agent i ∈ N . By increasing his price-bid xi
up to at most the yardstick price x¯i both neighbor yardstick bids increase and so
does agent i’s expectation of him winning the auction.
The argument is straightforward: Since changes in agent i’s price-bid xi have
no influence on i’s computed yardstick price x¯i (as this is determined excluding
agent i’s bid from the data set), it is free for agent i to increase his price-bid up
to his yardstick price. Bidding his yardstick price, given the bids of the other
agents, increases the yardstick-price of agent i’s neighbors and thereby increases
his chance of being selected by the principal. Note that if agent i bids above his
yardstick price-bid he will loose the auction for sure.
In a similar fashion we can show that if agent i decreases his price-bid,
both neighbor agents will get decreasing yardstick price bids which in turn
decrease i’s expectations of winning the auction. Thus, bidding below one’s
true bid is disadvantageous unless the bid is so low that it in effect excludes
the neighbor agent from the auction (in the sense that it makes the neighbor
agent j’s yardstick bid go below j’s price-bid). Such a situation is illustrated in
Figure 3, where agent i decreases his bid zi to z′i and hereby excludes j from
the auction.
We record this by the following observation.
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Figure 3: Excluding the neighbor yardstick bid
Observation 2: There may be situations where an agent by bidding sufficiently
below his true cost can exclude a neighbor agent’s bid and thereby increase the
expectation of him winning the auction
As indicated by Observation 2, there may exist Nash equilibria where some
agent (say, the one with highest quality level) excludes the other agents by a
0-price-bid.
Example 2: Consider three agents {1, 2, 3} with true cost-quality combina-
tions; (c1, y1) = (1, 2), (c2, y2) = (2, 4) and (c3, y3) = (3, 7). Assume that the
principal decides on zP = (6, 8). Now, let agents 1 and 2 submit their true bids
z1 = (1, 2) and z2 = (2, 4) while agent 3 submits the bid z3 = (0, 7). Clearly,
the profile z = (z1, z2, z3) is a Nash equilibrium since yardstick prices become
x¯ = (0, 0, 5). Therefore the principal is presented with the singleton set of yard-
stick bids Z¯ = {(5, 7)} which he then chooses as winner independent of his
preferences. Hence, agent 3 is optimizing and agent 1 and 2 cannot do better
given the strategy of agent 3. Consequently, the strategy profile z is a Nash
equilibrium. 4
The example above reveals the existence of Nash equilibria where the k′th
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agent (ordered according to quality level) submits a 0-price-bid while agents
with higher quality levels submit the truth and agents with lower quality levels
can submit any bid. What determines the number k is whether the k’th agent
has a yardstick price, given a 0-price-bid of agent k− 1, which is above k’s true
cost such that he does not win with a loss: by bidding the truth, agents k + 1
to n ensure that they do not win with a loss. Agents 1 to k − 1 are in effect
excluded from the auction by agent k′s 0-price-bid.
In fact, such 0-bid equilibria are the only type of Nash equilibria in the model.
Indeed, we can show that there does not exist equilibria where all bidders submit
a positive price-bid. We record this as Observation 3 below.
Observation 3: No Nash equilibrium exists for which xi > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Proof: By contradiction assume that an equilibrium exists for which xi > 0
for all i ∈ N . By Observation 1, no agent will bid below his yardstick price:
Indeed, if some bid is below the yardstick price the agent could increase his
chances of winning by increasing his bid up to the yardstick price. Also bids
cannot be above the yardstick price since this would lead to exclusion and
thereby zero pay-off. Thus, all bids must lie on a horizontal line where xi = xP
for all i ∈ N : Indeed, if xj 6= xP for some j then there exists an agent h for
which yh ≥ yj and x¯h 6= xh.
When xi = xP for all i ∈ N, the agent i∗ with the highest quality level yi∗ can
win the auction by bidding (yi
∗
, 0) and be compensated with the yardstick price
x¯i
∗
= xP ≥ xi∗ contradicting that the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
An immediate consequence of Observation 3 is that truth-telling cannot
constitute a Nash equilibrium. In practice, 0-price bidding is a risky strategy
though. Often it will lead to winner’s curse as we demonstrate by a simulation
study in the next section. In fact, we also demonstrate that truthful bidding
may well turn out to be a focal point in practice, also because it is ex post
individually rational.
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5. Simulation Framework
Based on the Yardstick Auction described in the previous section, we now
introduce the simulation framework that allows us to analyze two scenarios: a)
0-price Nash equilibrium behavior of the bidder with highest quality level, and
b) truth-telling as an alternative focal point.
In the proposed framework the principal’s value function is given by V (y, α) =
αy, with α independently drawn from the uniform distribution U(6, 16) and y
the agents’ reported quality levels, independently drawn from the uniform dis-
tribution U(1, 10). Most importantly, drawing parameter α from a random
distribution, models the principal’s uncertainty of its preference function before
receiving the agents’ bids.
Furthermore, the agents’ costs are determined by the common underlying
cost function x(y) = y2 and the individual inefficiencies in production modeled
by the parameter i ∼ U(1, 1.5) resulting in individual costs xi(y) = iy2.
We simulate the mechanism 103 times for 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32 partici-
pating agents. In every iteration we simulate for each one of the agents a set
of bids (yi, xi) by randomly drawing yi and i and the principal’s preference
by randomly drawing α. For every iteration there is also an upper bound bid
zP = (yP , xP ) with yP being equal to the upper bound of the distribution of
the reported quality (hence yP = 10) and xP ∼ U(90, 110). We compute the
yardstick bids and corresponding scores, identify the winner of the auction and
calculate the utility that the winner of the auction derives after producing the
promised quality. We then introduce deviation from truth-telling for all agents
but one (labeled as the ‘selected agent’) by multiplying the agents’ costs with
a parameter randomly drawn from a uniform distribution centered in 1. For a
deviation up to X% above and below the true cost we use U(1−X, 1 +X). For
example, a deviation up to 20% above and below the true cost we use U(0.8, 1.2).
Identifying the ‘selected agent’ depends on the scenario. Specifically, for the
0-price Nash equilibrium case the selected agent is the agent with the highest
reported quality, while in the truth-telling scenario we focus our analysis on
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the agent identified as the ‘winner’ of the auction in a trial run where everyone
reports the truth.
Assuming that all agents, except for the initial winner, are capable of under
or over reporting their costs we proceed to compute their yardstick bids based
on these ’misreported’ bids, and examine whether the selected agent in each
scenario remains a winner despite the misreporting of the others.
Technically, all simulations are done in R and all DEA programs are solved
using the ”Benchmarking” package for R, cf. [9] and [10]. Our parameter choices
will be further discussed in section 6.1 below.
6. Simulation Results
Having described the simulation’s input parameters and objectives we now
present our numerical findings grouped into two sets of simulations. First, we
present the simulation results for the 0-price Nash equilibrium behavior of the
bidder with the highest quality level and then, we present the simulation results
of truth-telling as focal point.
The simulation results for the 0-price equilibrium scenario are reported in
Figure 4. In Figure 4 (a) we show that as the number of participating bidders
increases the percentage of auctions in which the bidder with the highest re-
ported quality, denoted as i∗, wins the auction with a gain (pii
∗ ≥ 0) by bidding
sufficiently below his true cost, drops significantly. The range of misreporting of
all other agents, denoted as X, is equal to 10% and 20% (cu=0.1 and 0.2) respec-
tively7. In particular, we see that for more than 12 bidders only approximately
5% of all auctions are successful for i∗. Moreover, as demonstrated in Figure 4
(b) the required misreporting of i∗ approaches 100% (i.e. 0-price) proving that,
in fact, aggressive bidding is needed to win the auction by ‘price-dumping’.
With the 0-price Nash equilibrium behavior being both highly risky for the
manipulating bidder and potentially unrealistic in practice due to the close to
7Note that if the other bidders were allowed a higher degree of misreporting our results
will be even stronger in the sense that there will be even fewer cases where the auction is won
with a gain.
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Figure 4: 0-price Nash equilibrium behavior: (a) the percentage of auctions won with a gain;
(b) downward deviation in percentage of actual cost.
0-price-bids, we now turn to the simulation results concerning the truth-telling
strategy. By definition, a bidder can not win the auction with a loss by telling
the truth, however, other agents’ misreporting may cause the otherwise winning
bidder to lose the auction. The results from this simulation are reported in
Figure 5. We fix the misreporting parameter X again to be between 0.1 and
0.2 and vary the number of participating agents. In Figure 5 (a) we show the
percentage of auctions in which the initial winner remains the winner despite the
fact that all other agents misreport. In Figure 5 (b) we focus on the cases where
the other agents’ misreporting results in a new winner (henceforth referred as
“new-winner”) and report the percentage of these cases where the new-winner
wins with a loss.
The simulation indicates that for a reasonable degree of misreporting (up to
20%) the initial winner remains the winner in the vast majority of the simulation
iterations despite the fact that all other agents misreport. Overall we consider
this a positive result, especially given that both simulations also suggest that
for the majority of the cases where misreporting results in a new winner, this
new-winner faces a loss in utility. In fact in Figure 5 (b) we demonstrate that as
the number of bidders increases, so does the percentage of new-winners facing
losses in their utilities.
To sum up, simulations show that it requires a significant deviation to win,
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Figure 5: Truth telling as a focal point for the initial winner of the auction: (a) the percentage
of auction where the initial winner remains the winner; (b) the percentage of new winners
facing winner’s curse.
while that significant deviation involves an increasing chance of winner’s curse,
i.e., that the winner wins with a loss. Combining the results from both scenarios
shows that irrespective of the number of competing bidders as well as the degree
of misreporting, 80 to 89% of all auctions will either have the same winner (the
initial winner) or a new winner who wins with a loss.
Consequently, we conclude that bidding truthful may very well be a focal
point in practice. It is ex post individually rational and the optimal strategy in
the vast majority of cases.
6.1. Discussion of the simulation assumptions
In the simulation framework we make use of the uniform distribution in
connection with various parameter choices. We shall here briefly discuss these
choices and how they will influence the result of our simulation study.
Concerning the principal (or buyer) we have made two assumptions:
i) α ∈ U [6, 16]. The uniform distribution’s limits for the parameter α have
been set to 6 and 16 in order to represent a suitably broad range of po-
tential preferences of the principal. Since we assume to have a common
underlying cost function of the form x(Y ) = y2, truth-telling and no in-
efficiency in production (i.e. i = 1 ∀ i) for all bidders, would imply that
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the principal picks a quality-price-bid where the quality level is between
3 and 8 (recall that y ∈ U [1, 10]). Obviously more extreme quality levels
can be selected when we allow for individual inefficiencies in production.
Narrowing or spreading the interval [6, 16] will have a negligible influence
on our simulation results as confirmed by further simulations.
ii) xP ∈ U [90, 110]. The limits of the uniform distribution of xP is determined
as a plus-minus 10% deviation from the true underlying cost of 100. This
reflects the principal’s uncertainty when choosing zP in the initial step of
the mechanism. Unlike the choice of α, the choice of xP has a direct impact
on the simulation results in the sense that it influences the yardstick price
of the agent with the highest quality level. As xP increases so does the
yardstick price of the bidder with the highest quality level. Hence, the
higher the value of xP the more it favors the 0-price bidding of the bidder
with the highest quality level. By randomly drawing a level which is in a
10% range above and below true costs for y = 10 (maximum quality level)
we therefore try to neutralize this effect.
Concerning the bidders (or sellers) we have made two assumptions:
i) i ∈ U [1, 1.5]. That production units may have up to 50% technical ineffi-
ciency is supported by several empirical productivity studies (see e.g.[9]).
The effect a change in this parameter can have on our simulation study
is two-fold. On the one hand, higher inefficiency tends to exclude more
bidders from the auction. On the other hand, increasing inefficiency tends
to increase yardstick prices. Consequently, the probability of winning with
a gain by following the 0-price strategy weakly increases with increased
inefficiency level. Looking at truth-telling as a focal point the effect of
changing the inefficiency level is far less obvious though. Further simula-
tions tend to show that the effect is marginal.
ii) xi(y) = iy2.While the theoretical analysis is based on a more general class
of convex cost functions defined in Section 3, in the simulations we consider
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quadratic cost functions mainly due to their popularity in auction related
literature and the general economic theory. Simulations using other forms
of cost functions such as xi(y) = iy3 confirms our previous findings.
7. Conclusion
We have analyzed a two-attribute procurement auction that uses yardstick
competition to simplify the procurement process. The yardstick auction re-
duces the cost of articulating preferences to a mere problem of picking a favored
alternative, as with posted prices.
Although the individual bidders cannot influence the compensation if win-
ning, the auction is not strategy-proof. We proved that there only exist Nash
equilibria which involve extreme 0-price bidding. Nevertheless, 0-price bidding
behavior is clearly highly risky as illustrated by our simulations which showed
that with sufficient competition among bidders the chance of facing winner’s
curse is around 95%. Truthful bidding on the other hand is ex post individu-
ally rational and as demonstrated by our simulations it is very likely that the
bidder that wins if all bidders report the truth, remains the winner even if all
other bidders are allowed to deviate substantially from the truth. Again it was
shown that if deviation from the truth results in a new winner he is very likely
to face winner’s curse. This suggests, that in practice truthful reporting is an
alternative focal point of the yardstick mechanism.
Assuming that the bidders report truthfully in practice it is possible to mea-
sure the cost of not investing in articulating a traditional ”scoring function”
for the principal. Additional simulations indicate that in the majority of cases
the yardstick auction results in the same winner as a traditional second score
auction with a priori announced scoring function. This confirms that the yard-
stick auction is not an efficient auction, however the simulations also indicate
that the actual drop in social value from not having a scoring function decreases
significantly. In fact, as the number of participants reaches approximately 10
there is only a marginal drop in social value from not having to articulate a
scoring function.
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Further adjustments of the auction set-up may strengthen the conjecture
that truthful reporting is a focal point. For example we may try to limit bidding
above true cost by using the principals choice to elicit potential scoring functions
and use these along the lines of a traditional scoring auction. We leave the details
for future research.
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